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Executive Summary
THiS poLiCy pApER looks into the characteristics of lone actor terrorists in the European Union (2000-2015). It is part of the Countering Lone Actor Terrorism (CLAT) project that looks into this phenomenon through analysis of data pertaining to plots and cases of lone 
actor terrorism within the EU.
This paper will focus on the personal characteristics of lone actor terrorists, resulting in a number 
of policy recommendations. First of all, some of the key findings from the previous analysis 
paper are highlighted. Subsequently, the authors outline the following recommendations based 
on the findings:
1. Although overall data metrics are useful, specifically focusing on certain sub-groups  
could provide more insight into shared characteristics of certain groups
 Ê  In order to accurately interpret results, it is necessary to have appropriate   
 benchmarks. For instance, we found that 35% of the perpetrators reportedly  
 suffered from some kind of mental health disorder. The estimated percentage  
 for the general population is 27%. 
 Ê  It is relevant to look into certain combinations of variables and characteristics, 
rather than single ones, such as legal gun possession and mental health problems.
2.  Lowering barriers to mental health services should be key. Part of this effort should 
be focused on removing taboos on speaking about mental health problems in certain 
communities. Trust and openness play a crucial role in this regard.
3.  A multi-agency approach is recommended, in light of identifying as well as assessing the 
risks posed by potential lone actors.
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Personal Characteristics of 
Lone-Actor Terrorists
WHAT DRiVES AN individual to commit violent extremism? Is the process of radicalisation towards violent extremism and terrorism for a lone actor different from group-based radicalisation? Can we identify indicators that signal if an individual is going down the 
path of violent extremism, and how can we subsequently prevent and counter lone actor terrorism? 
So-called “lone wolves” have become an increasing concern for governments around Europe, with 
recent cases such as that of Anders Breivik and the fear of violent extremist attacks by returning 
foreign fighters to their home countries. The Countering Lone Actor Terrorism (CLAT) project1 aims 
to answer these questions through analysis of data pertaining to plots and cases of European lone 
actors. 
For this project, lone-actor terrorism is defined as follows: “The threat or use of violence by a 
single perpetrator (or small cell), not acting out of purely personal-material reasons, with the 
aim of influencing a wider audience, and who acts without any direct support in the planning, 
preparation and execution of the attack, and whose decision to act is not directed by any group 
or other individuals (although possibly inspired by others)”.2  Examples of individuals who fall 
into this definition are the “classical” terrorists such as jihadists or right-wing extremists. In some 
cases, school shooters were also included, but only when they had a more broader societal goal, 
and aimed to influence a wider audience.
This research is based on a database perpetrators of lone actor terrorism within the European 
Union between 2000 and 2014. To that end, the project developed a codebook (setting out how 
incidents are categorised and recorded in the database) and collected data from open sources 
(court proceedings, media reports). This resulted in 120 perpetrators of lone actor terrorism, 
involved in 98 plots and 72 attacks, that were coded on a wide variety of variables. These cases 
are studied from four particular angles: attack planning and preparation, law enforcement, 
online and political engagement and personal characteristics. In this paper, that is part of 
1. The Countering Lone-Actor Terrorism (CLAT) project is co-funded by the Prevention of and 
Fight against Crime Programme of the European Union, and has been undertaken by a RUSI-led  
consortium. Partnering institutions include Chatham House, the Institute for Strategic Dialogue 
(ISD) and Leiden University, one of the founding organisations of the International Centre 
for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT) at The Hague. The project is grateful for the additional support 
received from the Dutch National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism (NCTV). It also 
acknowledges the support of associate partners, the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO, 
now the National Police Chiefs’ Council, NPCC) in the UK and the Polish Institute of International 
Affairs (PISM).
2. Edwin Bakker and Jeanine de Roy van Zuijdewijn, “Lone-Actor Terrorism. Definitional Workshop”, 
Countering Lone-Actor Terrorism Series No. 2, Royal United Services Institute for Defence and 
Security Studies, 2015.
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a series of four policy papers3, we will zoom in on these personal characteristics by briefly 
presenting the main findings as outlined in the analysis paper4 followed by a number of policy 
recommendations.
Personal Characteristics of Lone Actor Terrorists
One of the focus areas of the CLAT project is the personal characteristics of the perpetrators. 
The key question of this part of the project is: who are these perpetrators? Scholars have 
conducted some exploratory research into this area5 but due to a lack of reliable empirical 
data, a clear answer has yet to emerge. Despite the lack of evidence-based answers to our key 
question, there are quite a few assumptions and claims about a presumed “lone actor terrorist 
personality”. The media often speak of “lone wolves”, which invokes the idea of a lone actor 
being a recluse, detached from society, hungry for action and being able to strike out of the 
dark at any time. Another often-mentioned personality trait of the lone actor is that he or she is 
supposedly suffering from serious mental health problems that are the key triggers for violent, 
irrational and immoral acts. Many questions also pertain to the extent of difference between 
“group” and “lone actor” terrorists. Is the lone actor preferring a strategy of solitary action, is 
he or she forced to do so after failing to be accepted by terrorist networks (perhaps as a result 
of certain personality or behavioural traits that are deemed to be a risk for the group’s success), 
or are terrorist networks deliberately employing a strategy of “acting alone” - or for instance 
“leaderless jihad” - to minimise the risk of detection by authorities?  
Analysis of the Personal Characteristics 
In order to answer these and other questions, we have collected data on a number of biographical 
variables that might help us to confirm or falsify these claims. We have tried to come to an 
evidence-based assessment of a number of assumptions about lone actors. We have listed 
and studied the following variables for 120 perpetrators of lone actor terrorism as outlined 
in our codebook: 
1.  Age: What was the age of the perpetrator at the time of attack?
2.  Gender: What was the gender of the perpetrator?
3. See also Simon Palombi and Benoît Gomis, “Policy Paper 2: Attack Methodology and Logistics” 
Countering Lone-Actor Terrorism Series No. 6, Royal United Services Institute for Defence and 
Security Studies, 2016; Melanie Smith, Sabine Barton and Jonathan Birdwell, “Policy Paper 3: 
Motivations, Political Engagement and Online Activity” Countering Lone-Actor Terrorism Series 
No. 7, Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 2016; Clare Ellis and Raffaello Pantucci, “Policy Paper 4: 
‘Leakage’ and Interaction with Authorities” Countering Lone-Actor Terrorism Series No. 8, Royal 
United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, 2016.
4. Ellis et al., “Analysis Paper”, Countering Lone-Actor Terrorism Series No. 4, Royal United Services 
Institute for Defence and Security Studies, 2016.
5. For an overview of the body of literature on lone actor terrorism, see, Raffaello Pantucci, Clare 
Ellis and Lorien Chaplais, “Literature Review” Countering Lone-Actor Terrorism Series No. 1, Royal 
United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, 2015.
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3.  Education + drop-out: What level of formal education did the perpetrator have? Each 
entry indicates the level of schooling commenced, regardless of whether it was formerly 
completed. Possible entries are Primary Education / Secondary Education / Higher 
Education / Unknown
4.  Employment: At the time of the attack, was the perpetrator in employment? Possible 
entries are Employed / Self-Employed / Student / Unemployed / Retired / Unknown
5.  Relationship status: At the time of the attack, what was the perpetrator’s relationship 
status? Possible entries are Single / In a Relationship / Engaged / Married / Separated or 
Divorced / Unknown
6.  Children: At the time of the attack, did the perpetrator have children? Possible entries 
are Yes / No / Unknown
7.  Indication of6 Successful sibling: Is there an indication that the perpetrator had a more 
successful sibling? Possible entries are Yes / No 
8.  Indication of social isolation: Is there an indication that the perpetrator was socially 
isolated? Possible entries are Yes / No
9.  previous criminal sanction + details: Did the perpetrator previously receive any criminal 
sanctions, excluding traffic fines? Possible entries are Yes / No and there is a free 
text variable.  
10.  Indication of previous physical violence: Is there an indication that the perpetrator had 
previously committed violent acts? Possible entries are Yes / No 
11.  Evidence of drug use: Did the perpetrator have a history of abusing alcohol or of illegal 
drug use, or was there an indication of this? Possible entries are Yes – Alcohol Abuse / 
Yes – Illegal Drug Use / No 
12.  Indication of a mental health disorder7: Has there been any suggestion that the 
perpetrator suffered from a mental health disorder? Possible entries are Yes / No 
13.  Diagnosis and Treatment: What was the diagnosis and was any treatment given? 
This is a free text field where further details may be entered about the specific 
diagnosis and treatment.
14.  Indication of a Noteworthy Life Event: Is there an indication that the perpetrator had 
experienced a noteworthy life event? Possible entries are Yes / No 
6. It must be noted that for each of the variables which says ‘indication of’ only ‘yes’ or ‘no’ are 
possible entries. In cases where we could not find any information about this particular variable, 
we listed this as ‘no’ as there was no indication of the presence of this variable. Thus, ‘no’ could 
both mean affirmative evidence that this was not the case but it could also mean there was a lack 
of evidence pointing the presence of the variable. 
7. According to the National Alliance on Mental Illness, a mental illness or mental health disorder can 
be defined as “A mental illness is a condition that impacts a person’s thinking, feeling or mood and 
may affect his or her ability to relate to others and function on a daily basis”. This can include a 
variety of different disorders, such as ADHD, anxiety disorders, autism, bipolar disorder, borderline 
personality disorder, depression, dissociative disorders, eating disorders, obsessive compulsive 
disorder, posttraumatic stress disorder, schizoaffective disorder and schizophrenia, see https://
www.nami.org/Learn-More/Mental-Health-Conditions#sthash.aG8AULXP.dpuf, accessed on 
February 4, 2016.
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After collecting the data, the following observations could be made. First, the overall data show 
that is it very hard to find “typical” traits of lone actor terrorists. We found a mixed picture for 
most of the variables with the exception of the gender distribution (96% of the perpetrators 
being male). For a number of other variables where the results seemed significant appropriate 
benchmarks are needed to interpret the results. For instance, the result of 35% of the cases 
indicating a mental health disorder needs to be compared to benchmarks of local, national or 
international health organisations. Moreover, it is important to consult mental health experts 
to judge these findings. However, at first glance, this number does not seem to confirm the 
popular notion that lone actors are “crazy”, or “lunatics”. 
Another idea that we hoped to evaluate on the basis of empirical data was the extent of 
“loneness”. Are lone actors really lonely, or do they just act alone? We found 28% to be socially 
isolated which does not confirm the idea that the average lone actor is indeed a lonely person. 
However, 28% might be a high number when compared to the overall population. To accurately 
interpret this result, it is also necessary to compare these data with other relevant figures for 
the general population.  
Regarding the variable successful sibling we expected to find a number of lone actors to be 
less successful than their brother or sister. The data did not support this assumption. The same 
holds for the idea that perpetrators of lone actors violence are not well-educated, or, on the 
other hand, extremely well-educated.
The most interesting results appeared when we focused on particular sub-groups within our 
database and combined data on different variables. Although the database contains 120 cases, 
it was not possible to find data for each of the variables listed. In some of the cases, this 
problem was averted by the terminology of ‘indication of’ which only allows for a ‘yes’ or a 
‘no’. Especially when looking at sub-groups, however, the number of cases becomes too small 
to allow for statistical analysis. Therefore, we decided only to look at descriptive statistics and 
the correlation in a non-statistical sense – meaning in how many of the cases that we saw X 
did we also see Y – between a number of variables. For instance, we looked at social isolation 
in relation to mental health disorder. We also found that religiously-inspired perpetrators are 
seldom socially isolated. We also found that among the older perpetrators, most of them were 
right-wing and few of them religiously-inspired. For the younger group, we found the opposite 
results. Focusing on school shooters also proved interesting. We found that a high proportion of 
these were socially isolated and suffered from mental health disorders. 
All in all, these findings demonstrate the importance of looking at different subgroups. Overall, 
the data do not suggest support for any stereotype of lone actor terrorists or a “lone actor 
terrorist profile”. There simply is no typical lone actor terrorist. However, combining results on 
different variables and looking at subgroups could offer directions for policy-recommendations. 
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Policy Recommendations: Sub-Groups and Benchmarking
Our database contains information of 120 perpetrators from different EU countries, who have 
very different backgrounds and often act out of very different motivations. While it is useful 
to start from the aggregate data, we feel the most relevant conclusions can be drawn when 
comparing our data to benchmarks. 
 
Mental Health Disorder 
We found that in 35% of the cases, some reference was made to a mental health disorder. 
It must be noted that this does not mean that the perpetrators were officially diagnosed. 
In some of these cases, it meant that the direct environment of the perpetrator - family, 
friends, colleagues –  indicated that the perpetrator was allegedly receiving some kind of 
treatment for a mental health disorder. In other cases, it meant that the direct environment 
reported that they were aware of the fact that the perpetrator had been suffering from 
mental health disorders. Thus, this should not be interpreted as an official diagnosis of a 
mental health disorder, but it rather indicates whether or not the direct environment of 
the perpetrator had (retrospectively) received signals about a mental health disorder.8 
Mental Health Disorders
Mental health disorders include a wide range of disorders, from depression to paranoid 
schizophrenia. It is necessary to distinguish these types of disorders to understand the role 
of mental illness in lone-actor terrorism. Moreover, the reporting of clinical diagnoses among 
lone-actor perpetrators is rare. It was suggested that the Consortium distinguishes between 
cases where a clinical diagnosis has been made and those which rely on proxy indicators (such 
as news reporting that alludes to mental health issues), as it might not be possible to find 
accurate information about diagnoses in many cases.
 
How should we interpret this figure of 35%? This particular number could be interpreted in 
many different ways. Some would claim that this finding reflects the simple fact that in 35% 
we have found the evidence pointing at a mental health disorder, and in the other 65% we 
might not have been able to find the evidence. However, whereas it is conceivable that the real 
percentage is higher, the opposite statement could also be made: the real rate might have been 
lower. To some extent it could also be comforting or logical for relatives or acquaintances of the 
perpetrator to say that they “knew it all along” that “something was seriously wrong” with this 
particular person. Thus, the figure of 35% should not be regarded as a hard fact, but as a good 
estimate reflecting the share of lone actor terrorists who have mental health problems. 
8. Source text box: Sebastien Feve and Kelsey Bjornsgaard, “Lone-Actor Terrorism. Database 
Workshop”, Countering Lone-Actor Terrorism Series No. 3, Royal United Services Institute for 
Defence and Security Studies, 2015, p. iv.
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What then, does a percentage of 35 tell us about the population of lone actor terrorists: are they 
more confronted with these kind of problems than others, or not? As already explained, there is 
a need for an accurate benchmark to compare to our findings. The data most appropriate for a 
comparison is compiled by the World Health Organization (WHO). The WHO stated that “27% of 
the adult population (18-65) had experienced at least one of a series of mental disorders in the 
past year (this included problems arising from substance abuse, psychoses, depression, anxiety, 
and eating disorders)”.9  This includes a wide range of disorders. It must be noted that not all of 
them can be linked to violence. The Institute of Medicine reported that “[m]ost patients with 
stable mental illness do not present an increased risk of violence” and it also adds that “[m]
ental illness may increase the likelihood of committing violence in some individuals, but only 
a small part of the violence in society can be ascribed to mental health patients”.10 Therefore, 
we should refrain from making any causal claims about the relation between mental health 
disorders and violence. Clinicians have also noted that we should not adopt “the simplistic notion 
that (…) mental illness could act as a marker for potential assassins, when psychotic illnesses 
affect nearly 1% of the population (i.e. are relatively common) and assassins are extraordinarily 
rare”.11 Whereas there might be a few exceptional cases where mental health disorders might 
have indeed contributed to the violent act, the above-mentioned statements clearly warn us 
not to approach the question of lone actor terrorism from a mental health perspective. To put 
it simply, we should not regard those who are seeking mental help as a “pool” of potential 
lone actor terrorists. Similarly, it would also be rather absurd to start identifying potential lone 
actor terrorists by screening or paying close attention to the entire male population within the 
European Union (as 96% of the lone actor terrorists are male). Focusing simply on those who are 
seeking mental help would not only be inaccurate and probably yield little results, but it could 
also have serious ramifications. It could stigmatize those being in therapy and deter people who 
need help from seeking it, which could have serious consequences for the individual and his or 
her environment.
In conclusion, the benchmark of the WHO does enable us to judge the correlation between 
mental health disorders and lone actors as compared to the general population. When comparing 
our figure of 35% with the 27% provided by the WHO, we do not see a large difference. Another 
finding is that there are wide differences between the ideological groups – right-wing extremist, 
left-wing and anarchist, single issue, religiously-inspired, and other - which raises the following 
two questions: 
1. What is the difference between “mental health cultures” in the different countries 
in our database?
9. World Health Organization, Data and statistics, accessed on December 4, 2015, http://www.euro.
who.int/en/health-topics/noncommunicable-diseases/mental-health/data-and-statistics.
10. Marie E. Reuve and Randon S. Welton, ”Violence and Mental Illness”,  Psychiatry (Edgmont), vol. 5, 
no. 5 (May 2008), http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2686644/.
11. It must be noted that this statement was made in the context of those who threaten dignitaries 
in the United Kingdom. See: James, D.V., Farnham, F.R. & Wilson, S.P. “The Fixated Threat 
Assessment Centre: implementing a joint policing and psychiatric approach to risk assessment 
and management in public figure threat cases”. In: J. Reid Meloy & J Hoffman (eds.) International 
Handbook of Threat Assessment. New York: Oxford University Press, 2014, p.9.
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2.  What is the difference in “mental health cultures” between the different sub-groups 
in our database?
These are just two particular questions that we think should be asked by those interpreting 
the results with the aim of formulating certain policies or strategies to deal with the issues. We 
can already point to a figure by the WHO saying that “[a]bout two-thirds of people suffering 
mental disorders will never seek help because of discrimination and the stigma attached to such 
conditions”.12 This last point is particularly relevant when looking at the data within particular 
sub-groups. We found, for instance, that the percentage of mental health disorders within 
the religiously-inspired group (24%) is even a bit lower than the figure presented by WHO. 
Here we must take into account that there might have been factors leading to higher or lower 
bars for inclusion in both cases. In the next section on trust and transparency, we will further 
reflect on this. 
Other Variables 
Some other areas also showed interesting results when focusing on particular sub-groups instead 
of the aggregate data. The average age of all perpetrators was 29.7 years old. This effectively 
refutes the idea that perpetrators of lone actor violence are very young and can often still be 
found in (high) schools. When focusing more closely on sub-groups within the database, we find 
some interesting results. For instance, the combination of certain age groups and ideologies 
showed a clear pattern: the older perpetrators (40+) in our database were in almost half of 
the cases (47%) motivated by a right-wing ideology whereas the younger perpetrators were in 
almost half of the cases (47%) religiously-inspired. 
In sum, in order to be able to accurately interpret and work with the data, it is important to have 
appropriate benchmarks and also to identify relevant sub-groups where results might be more 
specific and thus relevant for policy recommendations.
Policy Recommendations: Trust and Embeddedness 
In the previous section we outlined why we need benchmarks to compare to our data. Our data 
on mental health disorders, combined with the observations by the WHO, and some comments 
received by mental health practitioners during the workshops of this project, helped us to 
identify the area of trust and transparency. When looking at the sub-groups, we found a large 
difference between the ideological groups and the score on the indication of a mental health 
disorder. For all clearly defined ideologies (religiously-inspired, right-wing and single issue) we 
found scores below the overall average (respectively 24%, 28% and 33%). The score that highly 
deviated from the average was found in the group “other”, where we found a figure of 70%. 
The group “other” is inherently different from the other ideologies listed: it is the group with 
the least well-defined ideology, with perpetrators who often “cut and paste” from different 
sources to form their own particular subset of ideological influences. Also, 63% of the school 
12. World Health Organization, Data and statistics, accessed on December 4, 2015, http://www.euro.
who.int/en/health-topics/noncommunicable-diseases/mental-health/data-and-statistics.
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shooters within this group also were reportedly suffering from a mental health disorder. This 
data could lead to several conclusions. It could be argued that those with a more vague ideology 
or a mix of different ideologies are perhaps less ideologically motivated but more often motived 
by personal frustration. To some extent, this shows similarities to what researchers from the 
Fixated Threat Assessment Centre called a “highly personalised quest for justice”.13 Secondly, 
it could also be said that these differences are perhaps not really reflecting differences within 
the actual prevalence of mental health disorders within different sub-groups, but rather 
reflect different “mental health cultures”. For instance, it is widely known that within certain 
communities, there is a taboo on openly speaking about mental health problems. Especially 
in some religious communities as well as many extremist scenes, this is simply seen as “not 
done”. This is not surprising, given the fact that the World Health Organization reported that 
two-thirds of those with a mental health disorder never seek help, which could also mean that 
people are less prone to speak about mental health problems to their friends and family. Also, 
national differences should be taken into account here as well, by also taking into account 
reports made by others.
Social Isolation & Lower Barriers to Mental Health Services
It is interesting to look at this also in light of the figures on social isolation. Contrary to some 
of the widespread notions about “lone actors”, such as that they are lonely, recluse, and living 
detached from society, we found that the majority is far from being isolated. In the religiously-
inspired group, we saw that the percentage of those socially isolated was very low (9%). 
Especially when these perpetrators were part of a religious community, they often have strong 
ties to their fellow believers. It is then also this group that is most likely to notice any change 
in behaviour, or mental health problems. It is thus not only desirable from an ethical point of 
view to lower barriers to mental health services. The existence of mental health services that 
are culturally and religiously sensitive is an important step towards building trust and lowering 
the threshold to seek help. This should first and foremost be a goal in itself, as improving the 
accessibility of mental health for those is need is a noble effort, and unfortunately still is a 
very pressing issue as we see reflected in the figure of the WHO. This does not mean, however, 
that it could not also be beneficial in light of countering lone actor violence. Removing taboos 
on certain issues such as mental health problems also increases the chances of “suspicious” 
cases being noticed or notified, although it must again be stressed that this should not be the 
starting point to approach the issue. This could both mean that mental health practitioners have 
the opportunity to help those who would normally not have entered their room. it could also 
result in families and relatives feeling safe to speak out if they get signs of potentially violent 
behaviour. As we have seen in the data, in some cases those acquaintances might have had been 
able to alert mental health services.
13. James, D.V., Farnham, F.R. & Wilson, S.P. ”The Fixated Threat Assessment Centre: Implementing a 
joint policing and psychiatric approach to risk assessment and management in public figure threat 
cases”. In: J. Reid Meloy & J Hoffman (eds.) International Handbook of Threat Assessment. New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2014, p.9.
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Although focusing on removing taboos and encouraging openness and transparency about 
mental health problems is one of the areas where progress could be made, we should keep in 
mind that the figures we have found do not seem to point at an unusually high prevalence of 
mental health disorders among lone actors. We must still keep in mind that the real rate might 
be somewhat higher due to a possible lack of reporting. 
Ultimately, the most important and most equipped “detectors”, however, are not the mental 
health practitioners or the local police officers, but family, friends, and colleagues who can 
make the most accurate judgement about whether or not a person is “at risk”. Against this 
backdrop, it is also relevant to briefly highlight the role that social care and social workers could 
play. They could also serve as sensors in communities to detect where individuals might cross 
the line into any type of violent behaviour. It must be noted here that there are also clear limits 
to what can be expected in this regard. Many lone actors were not known to either social care 
or mental health services, which makes this less feasible.
Policy Recommendation: Multi Agency Approach for 
Preventing and Identifying Potential Lone Actors 
An often-mentioned recommendation in many domains of counterterrorism policy is the need 
for a multi-agency approach. Few would doubt that this is an important step but it is rarely 
specified what this exactly means and how this should be attained. Recording and exchanging 
every piece of information about every individual within certain services would probably do 
more harm than good: it would be an unfeasible approach and it raises ethical questions about 
the right to privacy of individuals. Still, some areas can be identified where perhaps more effort 
should be focused on improving these information-exchange procedures. A striking observation 
in our dataset was that out of the fifteen perpetrators who legally possessed fire-arms, eight 
of these 15 individuals were also indicated to have suffered from a mental health disorder. Two 
different conclusions can be drawn from this. The first is that these eight perpetrators who 
were affirmatively indicated as having suffered from a mental health disorder might not all have 
been known to mental health services. This again reaffirms the plea made for more openness 
and trust within certain communities, which could have resulted in those perpetrators being 
noticed. Secondly, for those who were known to mental health services, it raises questions about 
the effectiveness of information-exchange between those responsible for legal gun permits and 
those within the mental health sector. Rather than having a broad approach of focusing on 
everyone within the mental health sector, specifically focusing on those with a known history 
of mental health issues who also aim for a legal gun permission is perhaps more beneficial. It 
is precisely in such areas where we might have the highest chance of detecting and preventing 
lone actor terrorism.
Some centres and services in a number of countries could serve as a good example or best 
practice of designing such a multi-agency approach. The earlier mentioned Fixated Threat 
Assessment Centre (FTAC) in the UK brings together police and social and mental health 
practitioners, such as psychiatric nurse practitioners who work on both separate and shared 
servers to both guarantee privacy as well as information-sharing. Whereas this particular 
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example relates to those who threaten dignitaries, Also, “Team Threat Management” (Team 
Dreigingsmanagement) of the Dutch National Police tries to bring together these different kinds 
of expertise in order to accurately assess the risk of certain individuals. It must be noted that 
both examples relate to a multi-agency approach of agencies involved cases of individuals who 
are already seen as posing a potential threat. 
Conclusion
In this policy paper, we have formulated some overall recommendations relating to our data on 
personal variables of 120 perpetrators of lone actor terrorism. We feel it is more appropriate for 
the professionals working in the different sectors, such as the mental health sector, to design 
and evaluate concrete policies. As scholars studying these 120 cases of lone actor terrorism, 
however, we hope to have been able to pinpoint some areas where we feel improvements 
can be made, or areas that should be taken into account when trying to interpret data. We 
have specifically outlined the importance of benchmarking and looking at different sub-groups, 
and we have pointed to trust and openness and a multi-agency cooperation approach as two 
particular examples of how we could move forward in the complex challenge of countering lone 
actor terrorism. 
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